Statutory-backed continuous disclosure regime and corporate disclosure behaviour : does corporate governance matter? by Chapple, Larelle June & Truong, Phuong
This is the author’s version of a work that was submitted/accepted for pub-
lication in the following source:
Chapple, Larelle June & Truong, Phuong (2013) Statutory-backed contin-
uous disclosure regime and corporate disclosure behaviour : does corpo-
rate governance matter? In EAA Annual Congress 2013, 7-9 May 2013,
Paris. (Unpublished)
This file was downloaded from: http://eprints.qut.edu.au/60588/
c© Copyright 2013 please consult the authors
Notice: Changes introduced as a result of publishing processes such as
copy-editing and formatting may not be reflected in this document. For a
definitive version of this work, please refer to the published source:
 
 
Statutory-Backed Continuous Disclosure Regime and Corporate Disclosure 
Behaviour – Does Corporate Governance Matter? 
 
Larelle Chapple 
School of Accountancy 
Queensland University of Technology 
Thu Phuong Truong* 
School of Accounting and Commercial Law 
Victoria University of Wellington 
 
November 2012 
 
*Corresponding author: 
Telephone: +64 4 463 5233 (ext 8961) 
Facsimile: +64 4 463 5076 
Email: thuphuong.truong@vuw.ac.nz 
 
Keywords: continuous disclosure, share price queries corporate disclosure, corporate 
governance 
JEL Classifications: G14 and K22 
 
  
Statutory-Backed Continuous Disclosure Regime and Corporate Disclosure 
Behaviour – Does Corporate Governance Matter? 
 
Abstract 
Since 1 December 2002, the New Zealand Exchange’s (NZX) continuous disclosure 
listing rules have operated with statutory backing. To test the effectiveness of the new 
corporate disclosure regime, we compare the change in quantity of market 
announcements (overall, non-routine, non-procedural and external) released to the NZX 
before and after the introduction of statutory backing. We also extend our study in 
investigating whether the effectiveness of the new corporate disclosure regime is 
diminished or augmented by corporate governance mechanisms including board size, 
providing separate roles for CEO and Chairman, board independence, board gender 
diversity and audit committee independence. Our findings provide a qualified support 
for the effectiveness of the new corporate disclosure regime regarding the quantity of 
market disclosures. There is strong evidence that the effectiveness of the new corporate 
disclosure regime was augmented by providing separate roles for CEO and Chairman, 
board gender diversity and audit committee independence, and diminished by board 
size. In addition, there is significant evidence that share price queries do impact 
corporate disclosure behaviour and this impact is significantly influenced by corporate 
governance mechanisms. Our findings provide important implications for corporate 
regulators in their quest for a superior disclosure regime. 
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1 Introduction 
Corporate regulation has long been controversial. However, with the increasingly 
integrated global economy and the upsurge in corporate scandals over the last decade, 
there is renewed interest in the identification and implementation of best-practice 
regulatory frameworks (Lopez-de-Silanes, 2003). The enforcement of more rigorous 
disclosure rules has been a priority in many regulatory reform programs that have been 
implemented across jurisdictions (Coglianese et al., 2004; Ferrell, 2004). For example, 
in New Zealand, a major regulatory reform occurred with an amendment to the 
Securities Markets Act 1988 (SMA). From 1 December 2002 this amendment 
introduced statutory sanctions to support the NZX’s1 continuous disclosure (CD) listing 
rules. As there is little evidence on the effectiveness of such mandatory disclosure 
regimes2, this study seeks to examine the impact of statutory sanctions on the quantity 
of public disclosures by NZX-listed companies. 
Broadly, the benefits obtained from corporate disclosure regulation relate to how 
successful the regulatory regime meets two complementary objectives: (1) ensuring that 
investors have sufficient timely information to make informed decisions, and (2) 
preventing unfair access to information and insider trading. Internationally, these 
objectives are jointly addressed through periodic and continuous reporting. 
Periodic financial reporting has the advantage of being structured and heavily regulated, 
but the information reported can be stale by the time it reaches investors. Continuous 
reporting can address the staleness issue but it is hard to regulate because it is difficult 
                                                 
1 The New Zealand Exchange Limited, which was formerly referred to as NZSE prior to 30 May 2003, is 
now referred to as NZX.  
2 For the studies that examined the CD Regime in Australia in various contexts, refer to Brown et al. 
(1999), Gallery et al. (2002), and Chan et al. (2007). 
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to establish when company insiders possess material information that should be released 
to investors. As a consequence, alternative regulatory approaches are evident across 
jurisdictions3. For example, securities regulation in the U.S. require SEC filing of 
quarterly financial reports and details about certain events (Form 8-K statements) within 
four business days after the event has occurred4. In contrast, Australian, U.K. and now 
New Zealand securities regulations require half-yearly reporting and the continuous 
disclosure of price-sensitive information. In contrast to the prescriptive U.S. approach, 
the principles-based CD approach provides managers with considerable disclosure 
discretion in the lengthy time period between periodic reports. 
The New Zealand setting provides an ideal environment to examine the effectiveness of 
a statutory-backed continuous disclosure regime for a number of reasons. First, the 
statutory regime was introduced only recently; hence, the formulation of the rules, and 
the accompanying provisions and guidance have benefited from the experiences in other 
jurisdictions (notably Australia) and coincided with the recent strengthening of 
corporate governance rules. Prior to the statutory regime, there was only a listing rule 
requirement to make timely disclosures. Second, most related research focuses on the 
U.S. market where a strong culture of private enforcement of tort and securities laws 
tends to mask the impact of public enforcement. Moreover, recent U.S. research has 
focused on the effectiveness on rules designed to prevent selective disclosure 
(Regulation FD) rather than on continuous disclosure. Therefore, the U.S. research is of 
limited usefulness in informing debates about the effectiveness of continuous disclosure 
                                                 
3 See Golding and Kalfus (2004) for an international comparison of disclosure regimes in the U.S., U.K., 
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Hong Kong and Singapore. 
4 In 2001 the SEC Chairman raised the possibility of a statutory-backed continuous disclosure regime to 
address disclosure issues arising from the Enron and other corporate scandals. However to date, only the 
scope of the Form 8-K disclosure obligations has been extended (Golding and Kalfus, 2004). 
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regimes. Third, while the New Zealand CD rules are very similar to those adopted in 
Australia, the New Zealand regulatory environment is significantly different. New 
Zealand has relatively light handed regulation and has a less litigious business 
environment. Indeed, there is little evidence of active enforcement of the New Zealand 
statutory-backed CD regime5 compared to the recent trends in Australia6. Fourth, from a 
research design perspective, a reliable data source exists to effectively test the impact of 
statutory sanctions because disclosure documents lodged with the NZX are available in 
electronic form for a number of years prior to and subsequent to the introduction of 
statutory sanctions. Fifth, in addition to the continuous disclosure requirement, the NZX 
has the power to issue “price queries” to its listed firms. This is a unique regulatory 
strategy in Australia and New Zealand that the market provider monitors the market and 
has the power to elicit responses from firms to explain fluctuations or unusual trading 
patterns in their securities. The price queries regime can be seen as a precursor to 
possible disclosure breaches (Marsden et al., 2008; Di-Lernia and Aspris, 2011). Whilst 
price queries have been studied in the context of market reaction to firms’ responses 
(Gong, 2007; Drienko and Sault, 2011), the price queries regime has not been 
substantially examined in the context of firms’ disclosure behaviour. 
To evaluate the effect of statutory sanctions on corporate disclosure behaviour, we 
examine changes in the quantity of market announcements lodged with the NZX before 
and after the regulatory change. In examining changes in disclosure, we consider 
whether firms involved in prior price queries (i.e. regulation action) is associated with a 
                                                 
5 The Fletcher Forests, Feltex, and Wool Equities cases are examples where alleged breaches of CD 
obligations did not lead to actual prosecutions (New Zealand Press Association, 2003; Macfie, 2006; 
Ward, 2007a, 2007b). 
6 In Australia, the recent Southcorp and Aristocat Leisure cases are important examples showing potential 
success of the civil penalty proceedings and class action against companies contravening the CD 
obligations (Golding and Kalfus, 2004). 
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change in disclosure patterns. We also code the types of disclosures firms make to 
determine some quality of the disclosures, whether the frequency relates to routine or 
non-routine, procedural or non-procedural, or internal or external matters. We extend 
the study by investigating whether corporate governance mechanisms (i.e. board size, 
separate roles for CEO and Chairman, board independence, board gender diversity and 
audit committee independence) have an impact on this effect. 
We identify 29,515 market announcements released by 125 NZX-listed firms across the 
full study period (including 854 firm-years with financial reporting date ending between 
31 January 1998 and 31 December 2007). The regulatory event occurred about midway 
through the sample, on 1 December 2002. The market announcements data are then 
examined for changes in the quantity of market announcements using both univariate 
and multivariate procedures. The multivariate procedures control for firm-specific 
characteristics (i.e. analyst following, cross-listing status, ownership concentration, firm 
performance, firm size, and growth prospects) known to impact the disclosure decision 
in the absence of regulatory change. 
Our results provide strong evidence that the move to a statutory-backed continuous 
disclosure regime have a significant positive impact on corporate disclosure behaviour. 
In other words, there is a significant increase in the frequency of market announcements 
(overall, non-routine, non-procedural and external) in the post-reform period. There is 
also strong evidence regarding the impact of various corporate governance mechanisms 
including board size, the separate roles for CEO and Chairman, board independence, 
board gender diversity and audit committee independence on this change in corporate 
behaviour. Our results also show strong evidence that firms subject to share price 
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queries tended to update the market more frequently and the impact of various corporate 
governance mechanisms did differ for firms subject to share price queries compared to 
those not subject to share price queries. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of 
New Zealand continuous disclosure regime. Section 3 summarises relevant disclosure 
theories and describes the research hypotheses. Section 4 provides an overview of the 
research design. Section 5 presents the results and the paper concludes in Section 6. 
2. Background to the New Zealand Continuous Disclosure Regime 
2.1 The Former Continuous Disclosure Regime 
Prior to 1 December 2002, New Zealand securities law only required issuers to provide 
periodic disclosures (the filing of annual reports), episodic disclosures (e.g. the 
disclosure of share dealings by directors), and IPO related disclosures (Erlenwein, 
2003). Listed issuers7 were also bound by continuous disclosure obligations under the 
NZX Listing Rule 10.1.1. Under this Rule, listed issuers had a general obligation to 
disclose all price-sensitive information (relevant information) once the maintenance of 
confidentiality ceased to have a greater value to the issuer concerned than to the public. 
Like most stock exchanges requirements, the NZX listing rules are purely contractual 
provisions that issuers accept upon listing. Like other listing rules, the NZX had 
responsibility for monitoring and enforcing compliance with Rule 10.1.1.  The purely 
contractual nature of the disclosure obligation led to concerns about the effectiveness of 
                                                 
7 Collectively, all listed entities (companies and trusts) are referred to as listed issuers under the NZX 
Listing Rules. 
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Rule 10.1.1.8 Specifically, the NZX’s enforcement mechanisms were considered 
inadequate, the definition of relevant information was vague, uncertain and broad, and 
the rules were inconsistent with international standards (Erlenwein, 2003). 
2.2 The New Continuous Disclosure Regime 
The new CD regime applied from 1 December 2002 under the amended Securities 
Markets Act 1988 (SMA). Resembling the Australian model,9 it was based on the 
principle that a strong (statutory-backed) continuous disclosure regime would deliver 
superior outcomes to a more onerous rules-based model and as a result, avoid the 
necessity for costly quarterly reporting10. Like the Australian regulatory arrangement, 
the SMA does not prescribe the CD regime applying to listed issuers; rather, it provides 
a statutory framework within which the NZX  operates. The SMA requires a listed 
issuer (a party to a listing agreement with a registered exchange) to make any material 
information about events or matters available to participants in the registered 
exchange’s market as they arise (SMA, Section 19D). Thus, the SMA preserves the 
autonomy of the NZX through recognising its primary responsibility for monitoring its 
own listing rules. It has also provided an enforcement regime to be implemented by 
                                                 
8 Erlenwein (2003) notes that the powers of the NZX (formerly the NZSE) were examined by the Court of 
Appeal in New Zealand Stock Exchange Listed Company Association Inc. (1984) 1 NZLR 699, where it 
was held that the NZSE was neither empowered nor required to make statutory rules for listed companies. 
Thus, the NZSE can vary its rules arbitrarily and it also has the power to interpret its listing rules and 
make rulings regarding the application of the rules. Furthermore, the NZSE’s contractual agreement with 
listed companies did not provide a role for the Securities Commission in ensuring enforcement.  
9 The Australian continuous disclosure regime represents a combination of stock exchange rules and 
statutory enactments. Under ASX Listing Rule 3.1, an entity has an immediate disclosure obligation when 
it becomes aware of any information that a reasonable person would expect to have a material effect on 
the price or value of its securities. The ASX continuous disclosure requirements have been backed by 
statutory sanctions since 5 September 1994. A failure to comply the continuous disclosure obligations 
could lead to civil and criminal penalties.  
10 A majority of participants in the New Zealand Securities Commission’s consultation process regarding 
to corporate governance rejected the proposition of mandatory quarterly reporting for three reasons: (1) 
the continuous disclosure regime is sufficient, (2) unnecessary compliance costs, and (3) the risk of 
entities managing short-term earnings (New Zealand Securities Commission, 2004, p.57). 
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either the Securities Commission, with its prosecutory role, or any other person with an 
interest in any failure to disclose. The SMA emphasises investor protection through an 
informed market – a market in which “material information” must be released on a 
timely basis. According to Section 19E, material information is defined as information 
that: 
a reasonable person would expect, if it were generally available to the 
market, to have a material effect on the price or value of quoted securities of 
the public issuer11 
Coinciding with the introduction of the amended SMA, on 1 December 2002 the NZX 
introduced revised  to ensure compatibility with the SMA. The revised rule provides 
that an issuer should release material information immediately once becoming “aware” 
of it. A listed issuer is deemed to have come into possession of material information 
once a director or executive officer has become aware of it in the course of the 
performance of his or her duties (Listing Rule 10.1.1). To assist companies in 
identifying material information, guidance notes to the listing rule provide a non-
exhaustive list of events. 
The NZX has recognised that there are situations where the issuer should legally be 
allowed to withhold material information. Although not incorporated into the SMA, the 
“carve-out” provisions are a vital part of the continuous disclosure regime. According to 
the provisions, material information does not have to be released when: (1) a reasonable 
person would not expect the information to be disclosed; and, (2) the information is 
confidential and its confidentiality is maintained; and, (3) it would either be illegal to 
                                                 
11 Erlenwein (2003) and McGill (2004) question the vagueness of the terms “reasonable person” and 
“material information” as defined in the SMA. 
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release the information, or it contains an incomplete proposal or negotiation, or 
comprises matters or supposition, or is insufficiently definite, or is for internal 
management only, or is a trade secret. Even if all three criteria are met, a firm can still 
be required to release specific information if it is necessary to prevent the development 
of a false market in a firm’s securities.12 
If an issuer is found to have breached the CD provisions, the Securities Commission has 
the power under the amended SMA 1988 to issue an order requiring the issuer to 
disclose the necessary information and to publish corrective statements at the firm’s 
expense. If the issuer commits a criminal offence in contravention of an order, a fine of 
up to $30,000 can be imposed. The Court may also make civil orders requiring 
disclosure or corrective statements, impose pecuniary penalties of up to $300,000, make 
compensatory orders, and order the payment of the Securities Commission’s costs and 
expenses. 
In many aspects, the disclosure regime introduced through the SMA resembles the 
recent Australian disclosure model.13 While harmonising rules across jurisdictions can 
reduce costs for cross-listed firms, it has been argued that costs have increased 
disproportionately for other NZX-listed companies.14 It is also not clear whether a 
statutory model is more effective than alternatives, such as the more prescriptive U.S. 
approach, in changing corporate disclosure behaviour. Whether there is an improvement 
                                                 
12 A false market is “a market for quoted securities which is materially influenced by false or misleading 
information” (NZX Listing Rule 10.1.1 (c)). 
13 The level of enforcement of Australian continuous disclosure regime has significantly increased in the 
post-2000 period (ASIC  Consultation Paper 5: Heard it on the grapevine, 1999; ASIC Launches National 
Continuous Disclosure Surveillance Program, 2000; The CLERP Audit Reform and Disclosure Act, 
2004)). 
14 See Erlenwein (2003), Gaynor (2003), McGill (2004), and Fargher (2004) for critiques of the new 
continuous disclosure rules. Also see Meade (2006) for the comparison of the New Zealand CD regime 
with the Australian CD regime, and the U.S. Regulation FD regime. 
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in timely information flows depends on whether managers perceive the increased costs 
of withholding information outweigh the expected benefits. 
2.3 The Share Price Query Regime 
The New Zealand securities market operates as a co-regulatory model – the NZX 
supervises and monitors the listed firms and assists the Financial Markets Authority 
(previously the Securities Commission) under SMA.15 The NZX monitors trading 
activities, in particular, for unusual price or volume fluctuations. The NZX surveillance 
branch has the power to send the firm a letter to draw attention to the fluctuation, to 
request the firm to explain if it has information that ought to be disclosed to the market, 
to explain the fluctuation. This query is publicly announced. 
Generally, research interest in price queries relates to the quality and impact (market 
reaction) of the firms’ responses to price queries. For example, Neagle and Tsykin 
(2001) produced an early descriptive study examining the firm’s responses to price 
queries. More recently, Drienko and Sault (2011) used an event study methodology to 
assess the impact of trading query announcements and found significant positive 
shareholder wealth and volume effects associated with query announcements. Marsden 
and Poskitt (2009) examined the causes of price queries, to determine whether the pre-
query price fluctuation is driven by informed investors or speculators. Their evidence 
suggests that informed traders. These findings are of interest to our study. If the price 
query is being generated by informed traders, this suggests that the firm’s management 
is failing to provide the market with price sensitive information, hence disclosure 
failure. Accordingly, we use the evidence of past price queries as a variable of interest 
                                                 
15 Refer to https://www.nzx.com/regulators/NZXR. 
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to subsequent disclosure behaviour. This is exploratory in the paper as we find very few 
(22 firm-year observations) price queries only in the post-reform period. 
3 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
3.1 The Disclosure Decision 
The disclosure literature suggests a number of reasons why management may be willing 
or reluctant to publicly disclose information. The adverse selection hypothesis suggests 
that managers choose to disclose or withhold information depending on a trade-off 
between the associated proprietary costs and expected benefits of informing investors 
(Verrecchia, 1983; Dye, 1985; Jung and Kwon, 1988). From a signalling perspective, 
managers may disclose negative information to deter entry of competitors to the product 
markets (Dye, 1986; Wagenhofer, 1990) or signal the superior quality of their firms 
(Akerlof, 1970; Teoh and Hwang, 1991). Managers may wish to signal the perceived 
inaccuracies in the market estimates of the firm’s prospects (Ajinkya and Gift, 1984) 
and reduce the private information acquisition costs to investors (King et al., 1990). 
Alignment of the market’s expectations may also be a desirable objective to mitigate 
potential litigation costs (Skinner, 1994, 1997; Cao and Narayanamoorthy, 2006) or 
reputation impairment costs (Skinner, 1994; Graham et al., 2005; Tucker, 2006) arising 
from earnings surprises. Voluntary disclosure of earnings forecasts and other 
information could be used to minimise cost of capital (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; 
Lang and Lundholm, 1996; Botosan, 1997; Graham et al., 2005). However, managers 
might also opportunistically utilise disclosure to maximize their compensation (Aboody 
and Kasznik, 2000). 
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Collectively, the voluntary disclosure research suggests that managers balance 
conflicting interests in deciding to disclose or withhold information. Ultimately the 
decision to disclose is strategically driven and influenced by the nature of the 
information held by managers, incentives of managers, circumstances of the firm, and 
expected reaction by investors to the disclosure.16 Intervention in the form of mandatory 
disclosure rules increases costs for non-compliance and leads managers to reassess their 
disclosure strategies. Research shows that the nature of the rule change and legal system 
contribute to observed variation in disclosure behaviour across regimes. For instance, 
the strong culture of private litigation in the U.S. appears to precipitate the early 
disclosure of bad news relative to good news (Skinner, 1994; Kasznik and Lev, 1995; 
Soffer et al., 2000; Baginski et al., 2002). A similar level of asymmetrical treatment of 
news in not observed in Canada or in Japan where litigation risk is low (Baginski et al., 
2002; Kato et al., 2006). 
3.2 The Impact of Statutory Sanctions on the Frequency of Market Announcements 
In the absence of research on the overall disclosure of NZX-listed firms,17 it is difficult 
to predict how statutory sanctions affected the frequency of market announcements 
released by NZX-listed firms.18  A priori we would expect any change in disclosure 
practices arising from the introduction of statutory sanctions would be similar to those 
observed in Australia following the introduction of their statutory CD disclosure regime 
                                                 
16 Refer to Healy and Palepu (2001) and Verrecchia (2001) for reviews of the disclosure literature.  
17 Prior NZ disclosure research only focus on voluntary disclosure in interim or annual reports or 
management earnings forecasts (Bradbury, 1992; Hossain et al., 1995; Owusu-Ansah and Yeoh, 2005; 
Wong and Wong, 2006; Dunstan et al., 2011). 
18 Other NZ studies on the effectiveness of the regime examine a number of alternative measures 
including bid-ask spreads, stock liquidity, market spreads, analysts’ consensus forecast and dispersion, 
stock market reaction to earnings announcements (Gilbert et al., 2005; Marsden et al., 2006; Poskitt and 
Yang, 2006). 
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in 1994. The Australian findings are generally supportive of an overall increase in the 
frequency of public disclosures. 
In an early study examining the capital market impact of the Australian statutory-backed 
CD regime, Brown et al. (1999) reveal that there is an increase in the frequency of 
price-sensitive disclosures made by the ASX-listed firms following the introduction of 
statutory sanctions.  However, the increase is confined to relatively small firms and for 
firms which are more likely to reveal bad news. However, their study only examines a 
relatively short period around the 1994 introduction date (from August 1992 to March 
1996) in which the enforcement action is considered to be weak.19  
In a more recent study, Chan et al. (2007) investigate the extent and nature of 
management earnings forecasts for a large sample of analyst followed companies listed 
on the ASX for the period 1994 to 2001. Their results show that the increased 
enforcement action by the Australian Securities and Investment Commission and the 
effects of legislative changes to the Australian CD regime have significantly increased 
the level of non-routine earnings forecasts in the period after 1 January 2000.20 
In a recent study examining the impact of the continuous disclosure reform on 
management earnings forecast behaviour in New Zealand, Dunstan et al. (2011) found a 
strong evidence of significant changes in forecasting behaviour in the post-reform 
period. Specifically, firms were more likely to issue earnings forecasts to pre-empt 
                                                 
19 There is little evidence that compliance with the CD regime was effectively enforced by either 
regulatory authorities or shareholders until the Southcorp case in 2003 (Golding and Kalfus, 2004). 
20 In the period immediately following the introduction of statutory sanctions in Australia, Gallery et al. 
(2002) observe that most earnings forecasts clustered around announcements provided in conjunction 
with a routine event such as the Chairman’s Address or the release of a periodic report. 
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earnings announcements and those earnings forecasts exhibited higher frequency and 
improved qualitative characteristics (better precision and accuracy). 
Assuming that the New Zealand regulation has had a similar impact on the overall 
corporate disclosure behaviour, we would expect to see an increase in the frequency of 
market announcements released following the introduction of New Zealand statutory 
sanctions in 2002. That is, when managers become aware of any material information 
which will impact on stock price, they are more likely to release announcements to the 
market following the introduction of statutory sanctions. Accordingly, we test the 
following hypotheses: 
H1: The frequency of market announcements released to the NZX increases 
following the introduction of statutory sanctions. 
3.3 Corporate Governance and the Impact of Statutory Sanctions on the Frequency of 
Market Announcements 
Corporate governance is especially important to ameliorate those agency problems 
arising from the separation of ownership and control and where such problems cannot 
be satisfactorily contracted away due to significant uncertainty, information asymmetry 
and contracting costs (Hart, 1995). Agency costs could be also mitigated by effective 
corporate governance mechanisms through enhanced corporate disclosure (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). And as argued by Gillan (2006) that the board of directors is the 
lynchpin of corporate governance. 
Therefore, we contend that beside the change in regulation (i.e. the change to a 
statutory-backed continuous disclosure regime), corporate governance mechanisms and 
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specifically the board structure would play an important role in shaping corporate 
disclosure behaviour. Accordingly, corporate governance mechanisms might diminish 
or augment the impact of the statutory-backed continuous disclosure regime on 
corporate disclosure behaviour. We, therefore, propose the following hypotheses in a 
null form: 
H2a: The frequency of market announcements released to the NZX 
increases following the introduction of statutory sanctions regardless of a 
firm’s board size. 
H2b: The frequency of market announcements released to the NZX 
increases following the introduction of statutory sanctions regardless of 
whether a firm has separate roles for CEO and Chairman. 
H2c: The frequency of market announcements released to the NZX 
increases following the introduction of statutory sanctions regardless of a 
firm’s level of board independence. 
H2d: The frequency of market announcements released to the NZX 
increases following the introduction of statutory sanctions regardless of a 
firm’s level of board gender diversity. 
H2e: The frequency of market announcements released to the NZX 
increases following the introduction of statutory sanctions regardless of a 
firm’s level of audit committee independence. 
4 Research Design 
4.1 Study Period and Sample 
The selected study period is an eleven-year period encompassing all market 
announcements made by firms regarding the financial years ending between 31 January 
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1998 and 31 December 2007.21 The final sample comprises 125 NZX-listed firms. 
These firms cover a total of 854 firm-years during which a total of 29,515 market 
announcements (including 16,720 non-routine, 8,286 non-procedural and 5,403 external 
market announcements) were issued. Details about this sample selection process are 
provided in Table 1. 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
4.2 Data Sources 
The NZX listing status was extracted from the Events section of the NZX database as at 
17 September 2008. The cross-listing status was taken directly from the NZX helpline 
services. The analyst following information was taken from the Forecasts section of the 
NZX database. All market announcements were extracted from the Announcements 
section of the NZX database. Data related to ownership concentration and board 
structure were carefully extracted from the annual reports which are provided in the 
Annual Reports section of the NZX database. Accounting and market-related data were 
obtained from either the NZX or Datastream database. 
4.3 Measure for the Quantity of Public Disclosures 
The quantity of public disclosures for each financial reporting period is measured by the 
total number of market announcements released to the NZX between the release dates 
                                                 
21 The starting financial year ending on 31 January 1998 is chosen as it is the earliest financial year where 
the disclosure data are made available on the NZX database. The ending financial year ending on 31 
December 2007 is selected to avoid any contamination that may arise from the further amendments to the 
continuous disclosure provisions under the Securities Markets Amendment Act 2002 which came into 
force on 29 February 2008. These amendments give the Securities Commission the power to seek 
pecuniary penalties and compensation from individual directors and officers involved in any continuous 
disclosure breaches. This decision to avoid the confounding impact of the further amendments to the 
Securities Markets Act 1988 is supported by the Securities Commission’s recent launching of a case 
against Nuplex Industries Limited and its current and former directors for the breaches of continuous 
disclosure requirements. 
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of the previous year’s earnings announcement and the current year’s earnings 
announcement. The market announcements are classified into routine/non-routine, 
procedural/non-procedural, internal/external categories. 
Market announcements in relation to events that are periodic or expected are considered 
to be routine and market announcements that are not periodic or expected are 
considered to be non-routine. Examples of routine events include financial reports, 
chairmen’s addresses at the AGM, and letters to shareholders. 
Market announcements are divided into procedural and non-procedural by applying a 
counter-factual test. The test asks if the market announcement was not made, would it 
be likely that the lack of disclosure would result in enforcements. Market 
announcements found probable or likely to result in enforcements (in the event of the 
lack of disclosure) are classified as procedural and market announcements found to be 
improbable or unlikely to result in enforcements (in the event of the lack of disclosure) 
are classified as non-procedural. 
Market announcements considered to arise from management controlled information are 
classified as internal and market announcements about external events not under control 
of management are classified as external. This division acknowledges that not all 
market announcements released under the continuous disclosure regime are within the 
control of the organisational management as some market announcements are made 
regarding the actions of outside parties. 
4.4 Measure of Continuous Disclosure Regulatory Reform 
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The statutory-backed continuous disclosure reform came into effect from 1 December 
2002 under the Securities Markets Amendment Act 2002. Therefore, 1 December 2002 
is chosen as the cut-off between the pre-reform and post-reform periods. All firm-years 
with financial reporting dates ending before (after) 1 December 2002 are classified to be 
in the pre-reform (post-reform) period. 
4.5 Measures of Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
Board size: Board size is measured by the number of directors on the board. 
The separation of CEO and Chairman: This measures whether or not a firm has separate 
positions for CEO and Chairman. 
Board independence: Board independence is measured by the percentage of non-
executive directors on the board. 
Board gender diversity: Board gender diversity is measured by the percentage of female 
directors on the board. 
Audit committee independence: This measures whether or not a firm has formally 
establishes an audit committee and further whether or not the formally established audit 
committee comprises a majority of non-executive directors. 
4.6 Hypothesis Testing Procedures 
The hypotheses are tested using univariate methods, and due to the expected 
interactions across constructs, multivariate methods are employed to jointly test 
hypotheses and to control for common firm-specific factors expected to impact on the 
disclosure decisions. Given the nature of the quantity of public disclosures, we estimate 
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the Poisson regression model to make inferences about the hypothesised relationships 
and to control for the firm-specific attributes. The model specification is as follows: 
ANNOUNCEMENT/NON-ROUTINE/NON-PROCEDURAL/EXTERNALi,t = a0 + 
a1REFORMi,t+ a2BRDSIZEi,t + a3REFORM_BRDSIZEi,t + a4CEOCHAIRi,t + 
a5REFORM_CEOCHAIRi,t + a6BRDINDPi,t + a7REFORM_BRDINDPi,t + 
a8BRDDIVERSITYi,t + a9REFORM_BRDDIVERSITYi,t + a10AUDITCOMi,t + 
a11REFORM_AUDITCOMi,t + a12ANALYSTi,t+ a13ASXLISTi,t + a14OWNCONi,t + 
a15OWNCON2i,t + a16ECSIGNi,t + a17ECi,t + a18SIZEi,t + a19MBi,t + εi,t   (1)  
A significant positive coefficient for the REFORM variable will confirm H1. 
Insignificant coefficients for the interaction variables including REFORM_BRDSIZE, 
REFORM_CEOCHAIR, REFORM_BRDINDP, REFORM_BRDDIVERSITY and 
REFORM_AUDITCOM will confirm H2a-e, respectively. The definitions of the 
dependent variables in the equations are as follows: 
ANNOUNCEMENT is the total number of market announcements released to the NZX between the 
release dates of the previous year’s earnings announcement and the current year’s earnings 
announcement. 
NON-ROUTINE is the total number of non-routine market announcements released to the NZX between 
the release dates of the previous year’s earnings announcement and the current year’s earnings 
announcement. 
NON-PROCEDURAL is the total number of non-procedural market announcements released to the NZX 
between the release dates of the previous year’s earnings announcement and the current year’s earnings 
announcement. 
EXTERNAL is the total number of external market announcements released to the NZX between the 
release dates of the previous year’s earnings announcement and the current year’s earnings 
announcement. 
REFORM is a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the current financial year ends in the post-
reform period and 0 otherwise. 
BRDSIZE the number of directors on the board 
REFORM_BRDSIZE is REFORM multiplied by BRDSIZE. 
CEOCHAIR is a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 for separate CEO and Chairman and 0 
otherwise. 
REFORM_CEOCHAIR is REFORM multiplied by CEOCHAIR 
BRDINDP is the percentage of non-executive directors on the board. 
REFORM_BRDINDP is REFORM multiplied by BRDINDP. 
BRDDIVERSITY is the percentage of female directors on the board. 
REFORM_BRDDIVERSITY is REFORM multiplied by BRDDIVERSITY. 
AUDITCOM is a ordinal variable taking the value of 0 if the firm did not formally establish an audit 
committee, 1 if the firm did formally established an audit committee, and 2 if the formally established 
audit committee comprises a majority of non-executive directors. 
REFORM_AUDITCOM is REFORM multiplied by AUDITCOM. 
ANALYST is a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the firm is followed by analysts and 0 
otherwise. 
ASXLIST is a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 if the firm is cross-listed on the Australian 
Securities Exchange (ASX) and 0 otherwise. 
OWNCON is the value of the Herfindahl index of concentration of top five largest shareholders. 
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OWNCON is OWNCON square. 
ECSIGN is a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 for a positive current financial year earnings per 
share change and 0 otherwise. 
EC is the natural logarithm of the absolute value of the percentage change in earnings per share deflated 
by share price at the beginning of the financial year. 
SIZE is the natural logarithm of the total assets at the end of the current financial year. 
MB is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity at the end of 
the current financial year. 
The ANALYST variable is included as analysts are argued to performing a monitoring 
role reducing the opportunities available to managers to capture excessive pecuniary 
and non-pecuniary benefits from shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Also, 
empirical has shown that firms followed by analysts tend to update the market more 
frequently (Chan et al., 2008). The ASXLIST variable is included because a number of 
NZX-listed companies are also listed on the ASX where continuous disclosure rules 
have existed prior to the introduction of statutory sanctions22. On the one hand, large 
shareholders are better at monitoring managers’ activities as they could absorb greater 
monitoring and takeover costs (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). On the other hand, large 
shareholders could exercise their absolute controlling rights in the firm, exerting a 
powerful influence on managers in order to maximise their own benefits at the cost of 
small shareholders (Pound, 1988; Holmstrom and Tirole, 1993; Makhija and Patton, 
2004). Therefore, the OWNCON and OWNCON2 variables are included. The 
independent variables ECSIGN, EC, SIZE, and MB are those that have been commonly 
used in prior disclosure research (Skinner, 1994; Kasznik and Lev, 1995; Baginski et 
al., 2002; Gallery et al., 2002; Baginski et al., 2006; Chan et al., 2007) and control for 
firm-specific factors that lead to differences in forecasting behaviour across firms 
independently of the disclosure regime. 
                                                 
22 For example, the Australian CD rules have become increasingly more onerous since 1994. 
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In order to test whether the disclosure behaviour of firms subject to share price queries 
does differ from those not subject to share price queries, and whether corporate 
governance mechanisms do augment or diminish the impact of share price queries on 
firm disclosure behaviour, we construct the following model: 
ANNOUNCEMENT/NON-ROUTINE/NON-PROCEDURAL/EXTERNALi,t = a0 + a1SPQi,t+ 
a2BRDSIZEi,t + a3SPQ_BRDSIZEi,t + a4CEOCHAIRi,t + a5SPQ_CEOCHAIRi,t + 
a6BRDINDPi,t + a7SPQ_BRDINDPi,t + a8BRDDIVERSITYi,t + a9SPQ_BRDDIVERSITYi,t + 
a10AUDITCOMi,t + a11SPQ_AUDITCOMi,t + a12ANALYSTi,t+ a13ASXLISTi,t + 
a14OWNCONi,t + a15OWNCON2i,t + a16ECSIGNi,t + a17ECi,t + a18SIZEi,t + a19MBi,t + εi,t (2)  
Significant coefficients for the SPQ variable and the interaction variables including 
SPQ_BRDSIZE, SPQ_CEOCHAIR, SPQ_BRDINDP, SPQ_BRDDIVERSITY and 
SPQ_AUDITCOM will show evidence about the effect of share price queries on 
corporate disclosure behaviour as well as the impact of corporate governance on the 
effect of share price queries. 
5 Results 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Results 
Table 2 shows the number of firm-year observations where firms subject or not subject 
to share price queries partitioned by years and by the pre/post-reform periods. We 
observe a low number of share price queries received by firms in our sample. It is 
evident in Table 2 that all share price queries were received from the year 2003 onwards 
or in the post-reform period. 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables. 
The mean and median of the total of market announcements (non-routine, non-
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procedural and external market announcements) is 35 (20, 10 and 6), and 24 (12, 6 and 
3), respectively. There are 57,73%, 2.58%, 89.58%, 76.46%, 46.72%, 16.16%, and 
56.32% firm-years in the post-reform period, subject to share price queries, having 
separate roles for CEO and Chairman, having a formally established audit committee 
with a majority of non-executive directors, followed by analysts, cross-listed on the 
ASX, and experiencing a positive change in earnings, respectively. The mean and 
median of ownership concentration is 0.186 and 0.124, respectively, which is regarded 
as significantly high. The average board size is 6. The percentage of non-executive 
directors and female directors on the board is 81.7% and 5.3%, respectively. Further 
information in Table 2 indicates the mean of earnings change, firm size and growth 
options of -3.315, 18.675 and 0.402, respectively. 
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
To facilitate the analysis of H1 and H2a-e, which investigate the impact of the statutory-
backed continuous disclosure regime on corporate disclosure behaviour and whether 
corporate governance mechanisms diminish or augment the impact, we first divide the 
854 firm-year observations in the entire sample into the pre- and post-reform periods. 
As can be seen from Table 4, the mean and median of total market announcements 
(overall, non-routine, non-procedural and external) significantly increased in the post-
reform period. Firms in the post-reform period have a smaller board, separate roles for 
CEO and Chairman, higher percentage of female directors on the board, and formally 
established audit committee comprising a majority of non-executive directors. There are 
a higher percentage of firms followed by analyst and cross-listed on the ASX in the 
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post-reform period. In addition, firms in the post-reform period experienced a smaller 
change in earnings and had higher growth options. 
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
The correlation coefficients among independent and control variables are provided in 
Table 5. Pearson, Spearman and Phi correlation coefficients are provided for correlation 
between two continuous variables, between one categorical variable and one continuous 
variable, and between two categorical variables, respectively. It is obvious from Table 5 
that none of the correlation coefficients show evidence for any serious multicollinearity 
problem. 
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
5.2 Multivariate Results 
The regression results of testing our hypotheses are presented in Tables 6 to 9. The 
estimate coefficients on the REFORM variable is positive and significant at 1 percent 
level, which supports H1 that firms disclosure more information (overall, non-routine, 
non-procedural and external) to the market in the post-reform period. 
The estimated coefficients on the BRDSIZE and REFORM_BRDSIZE variables are 
significant negative at 1 percent level (except for 5 percent level for the BRDSIZE 
variable and not significant for the REFORM_BRDSIZE variable for the external market 
announcements); therefore, H2a is rejected. Firms with larger board tend to release a 
smaller number of market announcements (overall, non-routine, non-procedural and 
external) and this finding is more obvious in the post-reform period (except for external 
market announcements). 
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The estimated coefficients on the CEOCHAIR and REFORM_CEOCHAIR variables are 
significantly negative and positive at 1 percent level for the overall and non-routine 
market announcements; thus rejecting H2b. Firms having separate roles for CEO and 
Chairman were less likely to update the market with material information (overall and 
non-routine). However, in the post-reform period, firms having separate roles for CEO 
and Chairman were more likely to provide market with material information (overall 
and non-routine). 
The estimated coefficients on the BRDINDP variable are significantly positive at 1 
percent level and the estimated coefficients on the REFORM_BRDINDP are not 
significant, which effectively supports H2c. Firms with higher percentage of non-
executive directors on board tend to release more announcements (overall, non-routine, 
non-procedural and external) to the market and this finding holds across the pre- and 
post-reform period. 
In general, firms with higher percentage of female directors on board provide a smaller 
(larger) number of market announcements (overall, non-routine, non-procedural and 
external) in the pre (post)-reform periods, respectively. The significant positive 
estimated coefficients on the REFORM_BRDDIVERSITY variable for the overall, non-
routine and external market announcements effectively reject H2d. 
Firms with a majority of non-executive directors on their audit committee were less 
likely to provide market with material information (overall, non-routine and external) in 
the pre-reform period while those with a majority of non-executive directors on their 
audit committee informed the market more frequently in the post-reform period 
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(significantly positive coefficients on the REFORM_AUDITCOM variable). Therefore, 
H2e is effectively rejected. 
Further information in Tables 6 to 9 reveals that firms followed by analysts (except for 
external market announcements), cross-listed on the ASX (except for external market 
announcements), with extremely low or high level of ownership concentration, 
experiencing a decline in earnings (except for external market announcements) and 
larger magnitude of earnings changes, larger firms and firms with higher level of growth 
options (except for external market announcements) were more likely to disclosure 
information to the market. 
[INSERT TABLES 6 TO 9 HERE] 
The empirical results regarding the impact of share price queries on firms’ disclosure 
behaviour in the post-reform period as well as the potential impact of corporate 
governance mechanisms on that impact of share price queries are presented in Tables 10 
to 13. Firms subject to share price queries provided market with material information 
more frequently. Compared to those not subject to share price queries, firms with 
smaller board, having separate roles for CEO and Chairman (except for non-routine and 
non-procedural market announcements), lower percentage of non-executive (except for 
non-routine and non-procedural market announcements) or female directors on board, 
and audit committee with a majority of non-executive directors were more likely to 
update the market with material information. These results show that share price queries 
issued by the stock exchanges do have a significant impact on firms’ disclosure 
behaviour and this impact does vary for firms with different corporate governance 
structure. 
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[INSERT TABLES 10 TO 13 HERE] 
Furthermore, according to Hermalin and Weisbach (2003), there are other factors which 
might impact both corporate governance (board structure in particular) and firm 
attributes; therefore, a spurious correlation could be observed between board structure 
and firm attributes. The firm attributes mentioned in their paper could include corporate 
disclosure behaviour. Denis and Sarin (1999) document that board structure is related to 
firm size, leverage and growth prospects. In order to address the concern about the 
expected spurious relationship between board structure and corporate disclosure 
behaviour and detect a one-way causal relationship of board structure on corporate 
disclosure behaviour, a two stage least squares method is utilised. The natural logarithm 
of the total assets, liabilities to equities ratio and the natural logarithm of the market 
value of equity divided by the book value of equities are used as proxies for firm size, 
leverage and growth prospects, respectively.23 The results from this analysis provide 
consistent results with the original findings. 
6 Conclusion 
The objective of our study is to investigate the impact of the statutory-backed 
continuous disclosure regime on the quantity of market disclosures in New Zealand, and 
whether this impact is diminished or augmented by corporate governance mechanisms 
including board size, separate roles for CEO and Chairman, board independence, board 
gender diversity and audit committee independence. 
                                                 
23 In the first stage, each board structure indicator was regressed on the three proxies for firm size, 
leverage and growth prospects and the residuals of each board structure indicator were obtained. These 
residuals represent the unexplained portion of board structure indicators which are not explained by the 
firm-specific characteristics identified in the prior literature. In the second stage, these residuals replace 
the original board structure indicators in the testing model. 
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Based on a sample of 854 firm-years covered by 125 firms listed on the NZX with 
financial reporting dates ending between 31 January 1998 and 31 December 2007, we 
provide significant evidence on the positive impact of the statutory-backed continuous 
disclosure regime on the quantity of market disclosures (overall, non-routine, non-
procedural and external), and that the impact was augmented by the separate roles for 
CEO and Chairman, board gender diversity and audit committee independence, and 
diminished by board size. 
Also, we show significant evidence about the impact of share price queries on corporate 
disclosure behaviour which does significantly vary with different corporate governance 
structure. 
Our findings provide important implications for corporate regulators in their quest for a 
superior disclosure regime. Importantly, corporate governance mechanisms have an 
important role in shaping a firm’s corporate disclosure behaviour and the impact of a 
more rigorous disclosure regime on corporate disclosure behaviour varies depending on 
the strength of corporate governance mechanisms. 
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Table 1 
Sample Selection Procedure 
Selecting criteria Number of Observations 
Sample firms  
Total firms recorded in the Events section of the NZX database as at 17 
September 2008 
317 
Less firms recorded on the Events section of the NZX database not 
covered by the NZX database 
(113) 
Less firms listed on the NZAX (31) 
Less firms not issuing at least 5 annual reports since being listed on the 
NZSX or firms with missing market announcements 
(48) 
Total firms in the final sample 125 
Sample firm-years  
Total firm-years in the final sample 8971 
Less firm-years with missing disclosure, corporate governance, 
accounting or market data 
43 
Total firm-years in the final sample 854 
Total firm-years subject to share price queries in the final sample 22 
Sample market announcements  
Total market announcements in the final sample 29,515 
Total non-routine market announcements in the final sample 16,720 
Total non-procedural market announcements in the final sample 8,286 
Total external market announcements in the final sample 5,403 
1 The total number of firm-years includes all firm-years with financial reporting dates ending between 31 
January 1998 and 31 December 2007. 
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Table 2 
The Number of Firm-year Observations where Firms Subject or Not Subject to Share Price 
Queries Partitioned by Years and the Pre/Post-Reform Periods 
Year Subject to Share Price 
Queries 
Not Subject to Share 
Price Queries 
Total 
Panel A: Partitioned by Years 
1998 0 63 63 
1999 0 72 72 
2000 0 77 77 
2001 0 83 83 
2002 0 83 83 
2003 2 92 94 
2004 3 99 102 
2005 5 88 93 
2006 5 90 95 
2007 7 85 92 
Total 22 832 854 
Panel B: Partitioned by the Pre/Post-Reform Periods 
Pre-reform Period 0 361 361 
Post-reform Period 22 471 493 
Total 22 832 854 
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Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Mean 
Number 
Median 
Percentage 
Standard Deviation 
ANNOUNCEMENT 35 24 33 
NONROUTINE 20 12 23 
NONPROCEDURAL 10 6 13 
EXTERNAL 6 3 10 
REFORM (pre-reform 
period) 
361 42.27% - 
REFORM (post-reform 
period) 
493 57.73% - 
SPQ (subject to share 
price query ) 
22 2.58% - 
SPQ (not subject to 
share price query ) 
832 97.42% - 
BRDSIZE 6 6 2 
CEOCHAIR (CEO and 
Chairman duality) 
89 10.42% - 
CEOCHAIR (separate 
CEO and Chairman) 
765 89.58% - 
BRDINDP 0.817 0.833 0.186 
BRDDIVERSITY 0.053 0.000 0.105 
AUDITCOM (no 
formally established 
audit committee) 
96 11.24% - 
AUDITCOM (formally 
established audit 
committee) 
105 12.30% - 
AUDITCOM (formally 
established audit 
committee comprising a 
majority of non-
executive directors) 
653 76.46% - 
ANALYST (not followed 
by analyst) 
455 53.28% - 
ANALYST (followed by 
analyst) 
399 46.72% - 
ASXLIST (not cross-
listed on the ASX) 
716 83.84% - 
ASXLIST (cross-listed 
on the ASX) 
138 16.16% - 
OWNCON 0.186 0.124 0.177 
ECSIGN (negative 
earnings change) 
373 43.68% - 
ECSIGN (positive 
earnings change) 
481 56.32% - 
EC -3.315 -3.164 1.792 
SIZE 18.675 18.744 2.132 
MB 0.402 0.350 0.888 
Mean, median and standard deviation statistics are provided for continuous measures. Number and 
percentage are provided for categorical measures. Refer to Section 4 for definitions of variables. 
 
 36 
 
 
Table 4 
Univariate Comparison between Variables for Pre- and Post-Reform Firm-years 
 Pre-Reform 
N = 361 
Post-Reform 
N = 493 
Pre- vs. Post-
Reform 
Variables Mean 
Number 
Median 
Percentage 
Standard 
Deviation 
Mean 
Number 
Median 
Percentage 
Standard 
Deviation 
t-statistic (Mann-
Whitney z-
statistic)/2 
statistic 
ANNOUNCEMENT 27 19 25 41 30 37 6.537** (7.373**) 
NONROUTINE 16 10 20 22 13 25 3.650** (4.043**) 
NONPROCEDURAL 8 5 10 11 7 14 3.727** (3.981**) 
EXTERNAL 5 3 8 7 4 12 2.922** (3.152**) 
BRDSIZE 6 6 2 6 6 2 -3.644** (-3.586**) 
CEOCHAIR (CEO and 
Chairman duality) 
48 13.30% - 41 8.32% -  
CEOCHAIR (separate 
CEO and Chairman) 
313 86.70% - 452 91.68% - 5.536* 
BRDINDP 0.807 0.833 0.199 0.825 0.833 0.177 1.342^ (0.816) 
BRDDIVERSITY 0.039 0.000 0.076 0.063 0.000 0.121 3.653** (2.804**) 
AUDITCOM (no formally 
established audit 
committee) 
59 16.34% - 37 7.51% -  
AUDITCOM (formally 
established audit 
committee) 
63 17.45% - 42 8.52% -  
AUDITCOM (formally 
established audit 
committee comprising a 
majority of non-executive 
directors) 
239 66.20% - 414 83.98% - 36.613** 
ANALYST (not followed 
by analyst) 
221 61.22% - 234 47.46% -  
ANALYST (followed by 
analyst) 
140 38.78% - 259 52.54% - 15.838** 
ASXLIST (not cross-listed 
on the ASX) 
315 87.26% - 401 81.34% -  
ASXLIST (cross-listed on 
the ASX) 
46 12.74% - 92 18.66% - 5.389* 
OWNCON 0.195 0.145 0.174 0.178 0.111 0.179 -1.396^ (-2.116*) 
ECSIGN (negative 
earnings change) 
152 42.11% - 221 44.83% -  
ECSIGN (positive 
earnings change) 
209 57.89% - 272 55.17% - 0.628 
EC -3.129 -3.084 1.742 -3.452 -3.210 1.818 -2.611** (-2.376*) 
SIZE 18.677 18.611 1.995 18.673 18.883 2.230 -0.034 (0.299) 
MB 0.182 0.136 0.887 0.564 0.501 0.854 6.359** (6.621**) 
^, *, ** Characteristics are significantly different at the 0.1, 0.05, 0.01 levels, respectively (two-tailed). Mean, median and standard deviation 
statistics are provided for continuous measures. Number and percentage are provided for categorical measures. Refer to Section 4 for 
definitions of variables. 
 
 37 
 
 
Table 5 
Correlation Matrix for Independent and Control Variables 
 REFORM SPQ BRDSIZE CEOCHAIR BRDINDP BRDDIVERSITY AUDITCOM 
REFORM        
SPQ 0.139**       
BRDSIZE -0.123** -0.062^      
CEOCHAIR 0.081* 0.031 0.144**     
BRDINDP 0.028 -0.010 0.144** 0.307**    
BRDDIVERSITY 0.096** -0.017 0.060^ 0.033 0.003   
AUDITCOM 0.207** 0.061 0.217** 0.074 0.162** 0.136**  
ANALYST 0.136** 0.063^ 0.369** 0.074* 0.086* 0.218** 0.191** 
ASXLIST 0.079* 0.029 0.194** 0.027 -0.018 0.218** 0.103** 
OWNCON -0.072* -0.072* 0.044 0.091** 0.184** -0.036 0.107** 
ECSIGN 0.027 0.039 -0.026 0.001 -0.045 -0.051 0.021 
EC -0.081* -0.045 0.206** 0.055 0.094** 0.030 0.088* 
SIZE 0.010 -0.071* 0.582** 0.091** 0.084* 0.146** 0.286** 
MB 0.227** 0.120** 0.059^ 0.089** 0.025 0.039 0.062^ 
 ANALYST ASXLIST OWNCON ECSIGN EC SIZE MB 
REFORM        
SPQ        
BRDSIZE        
CEOCHAIR        
BRDINDP        
BRDDIVERSITY        
AUDITCOM        
ANALYST        
ASXLIST 0.061^       
OWNCON 0.101** -0.229**      
ECSIGN 0.079* 0.030 0.013     
EC 0.186** 0.106** -0.012 -0.015    
SIZE 0.543** 0.267** 0.154** -0.049 0.292**   
MB 0.164** 0.087* -0.033 0.037 -0.014 -0.073*  
^, * and ** denotes significance at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively (two-tailed). Pearson, Spearman, and Phi 
correlation coefficients are provided for correlation between two continuous variables, between one categorical variable and 
one continuous variable, and between two categorical variables, respectively.  Refer to Section 4 for definitions of variables. 
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Table 6 
Factors Associated with the Total Market Announcements in the Pre- and Post-reform Periods 
Variable Predicted 
Sign 
Full Sample Pre-reform 
Sub-sample 
Post-reform 
Sub-sample 
Full Sample 
Intercept ? 
 
-0.117 
(-1.550 ) 
-0.891 
(-6.740**) 
0.150 
(1.600) 
0.012 
(0.140) 
REFORM + 
 
0.266 
(19.530**)  
 0.002 
(0.030) 
BRDSIZE + 
 
-0.062 
(-15.640**) 
-0.090 
(-13.430**) 
-0.058 
(-11.540**) 
-0.047 
(-8.280**) 
REFORM_BRDSIZE ? 
 
   -0.021 
(-3.100**) 
CEOCHAIR + 
 
-0.072 
(-3.250**) 
-0.123 
(-3.720**) 
0.060 
(1.940*) 
-0.201 
(-6.190**) 
REFORM_CEOCHAIR ? 
 
   0.224 
(5.020**) 
BRDINDP + 
 
0.319 
(8.700**) 
0.342 
(5.140**) 
0.218 
(4.870**) 
0.393 
(6.130**) 
REFORM_BRDINDP ? 
 
   -0.111 
(-1.430) 
BRDDIVERSITY + 
 
0.590 
(10.720**) 
-0.417 
(-2.900**) 
0.866 
(14.550**) 
-0.141 
(-1.050) 
REFORM_BRDDIVERSITY ? 
 
   0.907 
(6.270**) 
AUDITCOM + 
 
0.057 
(4.810**) 
-0.038 
(-2.310*) 
0.124 
(6.970**) 
-0.009 
(-0.530 ) 
REFORM_AUDITCOM ? 
 
   0.139 
(5.900**) 
ANALYST + 
 
0.040 
(2.940**) 
-0.249 
(-9.980**) 
0.154 
(9.050**) 
0.051 
(3.700**) 
ASXLIST ? 
 
0.243 
(15.410**) 
0.573 
(19.820**) 
0.172 
(8.830**) 
0.247 
(15.540**) 
OWNCON + 
 
-1.590 
(-14.300**) 
-0.876 
(-4.140**) 
-1.797 
(-13.580**) 
-1.584 
(-14.220**) 
OWNCON2 - 
 
2.009 
(11.310**) 
0.947 
(2.670**) 
2.397 
(11.530**) 
2.022 
(11.350**) 
ECSIGN ? 
 
-0.052 
(-4.460**) 
0.003 
(0.130) 
-0.066 
(-4.630**) 
-0.055 
(-4.690**) 
EC + 
 
0.036 
(10.050**) 
0.062 
(9.780**) 
0.023 
(5.230**) 
0.035 
(9.690**) 
SIZE + 
 
0.196 
(48.990**) 
0.258 
(35.250**) 
0.181 
(36.650**) 
0.193 
(48.130**) 
MB ? 
 
0.080 
(10.840**) 
0.135 
(10.660**) 
0.078 
(8.360**) 
0.084 
(11.280**) 
Pseudo R2  0.335 0.298 0.336 0.339 
Model χ2  8,346.000 2,504.980 5,158.270 8,447.140 
p-value  0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
Number of observations  854 361 493 854 
^, * and ** denotes significance at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. One-tailed (two-tailed) test 
is used when the coefficient sign is predicted (not predicted). Refer to section 4 for definitions of 
variables. 
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Table 7 
Factors Associated with the Total Non-routine Market Announcements in the Pre- and Post-reform 
Periods 
Variable Predicted 
Sign 
Full Sample Pre-reform 
Sub-sample 
Post-reform 
Sub-sample 
Full Sample 
Intercept ? 
 
-1.404 
(-13.800**) 
-2.382 
(-13.890**) 
-1.161 
(-8.950**) 
-1.407 
(-11.930**) 
REFORM + 
 
0.081 
(4.570**)      
-0.009 
(-0.090) 
BRDSIZE + 
 
-0.108 
(-20.060**) 
-0.125 
(-14.490**) 
-0.109 
(-15.590**) 
-0.076 
(-10.370**) 
REFORM_BRDSIZE ? 
 
   -0.054 
(-5.960**) 
CEOCHAIR + 
 
-0.051 
(-1.720*) 
-0.153 
(-3.550**) 
0.096 
(2.220*) 
-0.178 
(-4.190**) 
REFORM_CEOCHAIR ? 
 
   0.219 
(3.630**) 
BRDINDP + 
 
0.379 
(7.740**) 
0.348 
(4.010**) 
0.302 
(4.960**) 
0.430 
(5.120**) 
REFORM_BRDINDP ? 
 
   -0.067 
(-0.650) 
BRDDIVERSITY + 
 
0.516 
(6.770**) 
-0.260 
(-1.440^) 
0.794 
(9.560**) 
0.163 
(0.980) 
REFORM_BRDDIVERSITY ? 
 
   0.449 
(2.470*) 
AUDITCOM + 
 
0.065 
(4.010**) 
-0.054 
(-2.490**) 
0.161 
(6.420**) 
-0.006 
(-0.300) 
REFORM_AUDITCOM ? 
 
   0.156 
(4.810**) 
ANALYST + 
 
0.120 
(6.650**) 
-0.126 
(-4.040**) 
0.217 
(9.370**) 
0.125 
(6.850**) 
ASXLIST ? 
 
0.337 
(16.310**) 
0.582 
(15.850**) 
0.310 
(11.980**) 
0.344 
(16.510**) 
OWNCON + 
 
-1.183 
(-7.960**) 
-0.392 
(-1.450^) 
-1.598 
(-8.840**) 
-1.184 
(-7.950**) 
OWNCON2 - 
 
1.377 
(5.790**) 
0.428 
(0.950) 
1.959 
(6.860**) 
1.400 
(5.870**) 
ECSIGN ? 
 
-0.071 
(-4.550**) 
0.027 
(1.020) 
-0.095 
(-4.900**) 
-0.069 
(-4.410**) 
EC + 
 
0.039 
(8.130**) 
0.091 
(11.040**) 
0.013 
(2.15*) 
0.039 
(8.030**) 
SIZE + 
 
0.244 
(45.560**) 
0.320 
(34.090**) 
0.219 
(32.520**) 
0.244 
(45.200**) 
MB ? 
 
0.094 
(9.510**) 
0.185 
(11.420**) 
0.060 
(4.690**) 
0.098 
(9.870**) 
Pseudo R2  0.307 0.324 0.306 0.310 
Model χ2  6,300.820 2,446.220 3,862.450 6,360.570 
p-value  0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
Number of observations  854 361 493 854 
^, * and ** denotes significance at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. One-tailed (two-tailed) test 
is used when the coefficient sign is predicted (not predicted). Refer to section 4 for definitions of 
variables. 
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Table 8 
Factors Associated with the Total Non-procedural Market Announcements in the Pre- and Post-
reform Periods 
Variable Predicted 
Sign 
Full Sample Pre-reform 
Sub-sample 
Post-reform 
Sub-sample 
Full Sample 
Intercept ? 
 
-2.236 
(-15.270**) 
-2.290 
(-9.080**) 
-2.467 
(-13.260**) 
-2.122 
(-12.520**) 
REFORM + 
 
0.120 
(4.720**)      
-0.121 
(-0.830) 
BRDSIZE + 
 
-0.055 
(-7.420**) 
-0.066 
(-5.390**) 
-0.055 
(-5.660**) 
-0.036 
(-3.480**) 
REFORM_BRDSIZE ? 
 
   -0.035 
(-2.820**) 
CEOCHAIR + 
 
-0.017 
(-0.390) 
-0.091 
(-1.420^) 
0.082 
(1.300^) 
-0.081 
(-1.280) 
REFORM_CEOCHAIR ? 
 
   0.112 
(1.260) 
BRDINDP + 
 
0.459 
(6.400**) 
0.244 
(1.910*) 
0.478 
(5.400**) 
0.353 
(2.850**) 
REFORM_BRDINDP ? 
 
   0.165 
(1.090) 
BRDDIVERSITY + 
 
0.458 
(4.070**) 
-0.253 
(-0.970) 
0.637 
(5.160**) 
0.305 
(1.290^) 
REFORM_BRDDIVERSITY ? 
 
   0.196 
(0.750) 
AUDITCOM + 
 
0.073 
(3.110**) 
-0.038 
(-1.180) 
0.156 
(4.290**) 
0.018 
(0.590) 
REFORM_AUDITCOM ? 
 
   0.127 
(2.690**) 
ANALYST + 
 
0.039 
(1.550^) 
0.006 
(0.120) 
-0.009 
(-0.290) 
0.038 
(1.470^) 
ASXLIST ? 
 
0.503 
(17.570**) 
0.756 
(14.880**) 
0.409 
(11.310**) 
0.512 
(17.690**) 
OWNCON + 
 
-1.934 
(-9.220**) 
-2.410 
(-6.320**) 
-1.789 
(-7.040**) 
-1.954 
(-9.290**) 
OWNCON2 - 
 
2.909 
(8.800**) 
4.387 
(7.120**) 
2.401 
(6.000**) 
2.964 
(8.940**) 
ECSIGN ? 
 
-0.051 
(-2.300*) 
0.054 
(1.410) 
-0.092 
(-3.330**) 
-0.052 
(-2.320*) 
EC + 
 
0.041 
(6.040**) 
0.100 
(8.390**) 
0.013 
(1.570^) 
0.042 
(6.140**) 
SIZE + 
 
0.229 
(29.880**) 
0.260 
(18.740**) 
0.234 
(24.560**) 
0.228 
(29.690**) 
MB ? 
 
0.075 
(5.290**) 
0.148 
(6.120**) 
0.026 
(1.450) 
0.076 
(5.340**) 
Pseudo R2  0.310 0.333 0.300 0.312 
Model χ2  3,677.100 1,365.770 2,269.680 3,693.820 
p-value  0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
Number of observations  854 361 493 854 
^, * and ** denotes significance at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. One-tailed (two-tailed) test 
is used when the coefficient sign is predicted (not predicted). Refer to section 4 for definitions of 
variables. 
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Table 9 
Factors Associated with the Total External Market Announcements in the Pre- and Post-reform 
Periods 
Variable Predicted 
Sign 
Full Sample Pre-reform 
Sub-sample 
Post-reform 
Sub-sample 
Full Sample 
Intercept ? 
 
-1.567 
(-8.780**) 
-2.899 
(-9.760**) 
-0.824 
(-3.630**) 
-1.295 
(-6.410**) 
REFORM + 
 
0.350 
(11.110**)      
-0.127 
(-0.770) 
BRDSIZE + 
 
-0.015 
(-1.670*) 
-0.066 
(-4.450**) 
0.002 
(0.180) 
-0.025 
(-1.890*) 
REFORM_BRDSIZE ? 
 
   0.017 
(1.040) 
CEOCHAIR + 
 
-0.080 
(-1.600^) 
0.060 
(0.790) 
-0.104 
(-1.530^) 
-0.029 
(-0.380) 
REFORM_CEOCHAIR ? 
 
   -0.103 
(-1.020) 
BRDINDP + 
 
0.224 
(2.670**) 
0.243 
(1.740*) 
0.198 
(1.830*) 
0.101 
(0.750) 
REFORM_BRDINDP ? 
 
   0.206 
(1.210) 
BRDDIVERSITY + 
 
0.293 
(2.300*) 
-0.642 
(-1.890*) 
0.584 
(4.200**) 
-0.394 
(-1.230) 
REFORM_BRDDIVERSITY ? 
 
   0.869 
(2.510*) 
AUDITCOM + 
 
-0.037 
(-1.440^) 
-0.092 
(-2.650**) 
0.043 
(1.070) 
-0.091 
(-2.690**) 
REFORM_AUDITCOM ? 
 
   0.146 
(2.860**) 
ANALYST + 
 
-0.090 
(-2.840**) 
-0.445 
(-8.050**) 
0.080 
(1.950*) 
-0.095 
(-2.950**) 
ASXLIST ? 
 
-0.560 
(-12.910**) 
-0.144 
(-1.860^) 
-0.609 
(-11.380**) 
-0.546 
(-12.500**) 
OWNCON + 
 
-2.690 
(-10.520**) 
-1.748 
(-3.640**) 
-2.605 
(-8.450**) 
-2.691 
(-10.510**) 
OWNCON2 - 
 
3.981 
(10.010**) 
1.172 
(1.410^) 
4.376 
(9.460**) 
4.023 
(10.100**) 
ECSIGN ? 
 
-0.022 
(-0.810 ) 
0.131 
(2.730**) 
-0.110 
(-3.230**) 
-0.031 
(-1.120) 
EC + 
 
0.079 
(9.460**) 
0.057 
(3.980**) 
0.091 
(8.780**) 
0.079 
(9.410**) 
SIZE + 
 
0.203 
(21.530**) 
0.285 
(17.660**) 
0.168 
(13.950**) 
0.201 
(21.200**) 
MB ? 
 
-0.022 
(-1.250) 
0.046 
(1.650^) 
-0.037 
(-1.630) 
-0.023 
(-1.310) 
Pseudo R2  0.102 0.111 0.112 0.104 
Model χ2  1,073.010 410.580 744.910 1,097.000 
p-value  0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
Number of observations  854 361 493 854 
^, * and ** denotes significance at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. One-tailed (two-tailed) test 
is used when the coefficient sign is predicted (not predicted). Refer to section 4 for definitions of 
variables. 
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Table 10 
Factors Associated with the Total Market Announcements for Firms Subject or Not Subject to 
Share Price Queries in the Post-reform Period 
Variable Predicted 
Sign 
Full Sample Subject to 
Share Price 
Queries 
Not Subject to 
Share Price 
Queries 
Full Sample 
Intercept ? 
 
0.105 
(1.110) 
2.345 
(2.800**) 
0.115 
(1.190) 
0.108 
(1.140) 
SPQ ? 
 
0.266 
(8.050**)      
-0.586 
(-1.820^) 
BRDSIZE + 
 
-0.059 
(-11.660**) 
-0.189 
(-4.100**) 
-0.050 
(-9.700**) 
-0.052 
(-10.180**) 
SPQ_BRDSIZE ? 
 
   -0.085 
(-4.910**) 
CEOCHAIR + 
 
0.051 
(1.660*) 
-0.446 
(-1.420^) 
0.042 
(1.330^) 
0.042 
(1.340^) 
SPQ_CEOCHAIR ? 
 
   0.818 
(3.580**) 
BRDINDP + 
 
0.224 
(5.000**) 
0.127 
(0.300) 
0.225 
(4.900**) 
0.222 
(4.840**) 
SPQ_BRDINDP ? 
 
   -0.085 
(-0.390) 
BRDDIVERSITY + 
 
0.867 
(14.590**) 
0.722 
(1.040) 
0.969 
(16.160**) 
0.966 
(16.080**) 
SPQ_BRDDIVERSITY ? 
 
   -2.941 
(-8.510**) 
AUDITCOM + 
 
0.118 
(6.680**) 
0.553 
(6.020**) 
0.098 
(5.360**) 
0.098 
(5.380**) 
SPQ_AUDITCOM ? 
 
   0.443 
(4.990**) 
ANALYST + 
 
0.162 
(9.480**) 
1.543 
(7.090**) 
0.161 
(9.230**) 
0.168 
(9.770**) 
ASXLIST ? 
 
0.166 
(8.520**) 
1.290 
(8.410**) 
0.134 
(6.690**) 
0.159 
(8.130**) 
OWNCON + 
 
-1.820 
(-13.750**) 
0.160 
(0.060) 
-1.913 
(-14.090**) 
-1.758 
(-13.240**) 
OWNCON2 - 
 
2.461 
(11.840**) 
3.304 
(0.340) 
2.591 
(12.220**) 
2.380 
(11.420**) 
ECSIGN ? 
 
-0.066 
(-4.570**) 
1.145 
(4.670**) 
-0.086 
(-5.880**) 
-0.081 
(-5.590**) 
EC + 
 
0.023 
(5.280**) 
-0.124 
(-3.840**) 
0.033 
(7.320**) 
0.028 
(6.360**) 
SIZE + 
 
0.184 
(36.950**) 
-0.014 
(-0.290) 
0.186 
(36.800**) 
0.185 
(37.020**) 
MB ? 
 
0.072 
(7.720**) 
-0.154 
(-1.610) 
0.056 
(5.830**) 
0.064 
(6.750**) 
Pseudo R2  0.340 0.669 0.346 0.350 
Model χ2  5,218.410 396.180 5,099.320 5,366.130** 
p-value  0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
Number of observations  493 22 471 493 
^, * and ** denotes significance at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. One-tailed (two-tailed) test 
is used when the coefficient sign is predicted (not predicted). Refer to section 4 for definitions of 
variables. 
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Table 11 
Factors Associated with the Total Non-routine Market Announcements for Firms Subject or Not 
Subject to Share Price Queries in the Post-reform Period 
Variable Predicted 
Sign 
Full Sample Subject to 
Share Price 
Queries 
Not Subject to 
Share Price 
Queries 
Full Sample 
Intercept ? 
 
-1.220 
(-9.35**) 
-0.017 
(-0.010) 
-1.236 
(-9.290**) 
-1.208 
(-9.190**) 
SPQ ? 
 
 0.319 
(7.18**)     
-0.657 
(-1.510) 
BRDSIZE + 
 
-0.110 
(-15.730**) 
-0.216 
(-3.130**) 
-0.100 
(-14.030**) 
-0.104 
(-14.490**) 
SPQ_BRDSIZE ? 
 
   -0.087 
(-3.660**) 
CEOCHAIR + 
 
0.085 
(1.960*) 
0.048 
(0.120) 
0.084 
(1.910*) 
0.087 
(1.970*) 
SPQ_CEOCHAIR ? 
 
   0.418 
(1.520) 
BRDINDP + 
 
0.312 
(5.120**) 
1.371 
(2.390**) 
0.302 
(4.850**) 
0.288 
(4.630**) 
SPQ_BRDINDP ? 
 
   0.389 
(1.280) 
BRDDIVERSITY + 
 
0.794 
(9.570**) 
-1.731 
(-1.670*) 
0.914 
(10.950**) 
0.911 
(10.870**) 
SPQ_BRDDIVERSITY ? 
 
   -2.926 
(-6.200**) 
AUDITCOM + 
 
0.154 
(6.130**) 
0.605 
(4.260**) 
0.136 
(5.260**) 
0.136 
(5.250**) 
SPQ_AUDITCOM ? 
 
   0.514 
(3.760**) 
ANALYST + 
 
0.226 
(9.720**) 
1.258 
(4.120**) 
0.217 
(9.160**) 
0.232 
(9.890**) 
ASXLIST ? 
 
0.302 
(11.670**) 
1.338 
(6.300**) 
0.270 
(10.130**) 
0.299 
(11.480**) 
OWNCON + 
 
-1.622 
(-8.980**) 
9.228 
(2.210*) 
-1.804 
(-9.720**) 
-1.544 
(-8.520**) 
OWNCON2 - 
 
2.030 
(7.110**) 
-23.708 
(-1.670*) 
2.287 
(7.850**) 
1.928 
(6.730**) 
ECSIGN ? 
 
-0.093 
(-4.760**) 
0.362 
(1.100) 
-0.109 
(-5.460**) 
-0.109 
(-5.530**) 
EC + 
 
0.013 
(2.230*) 
-0.160 
(-3.420**) 
0.023 
(3.800**) 
0.017 
(2.920**) 
SIZE + 
 
0.223 
(32.800**) 
0.015 
(0.220) 
0.227 
(32.820**) 
0.223 
(32.750**) 
MB ? 
 
0.053 
(4.180**) 
-0.233 
(-1.690^) 
0.026 
(1.960^) 
0.043 
(3.290**) 
Pseudo R2  0.310 0.655 0.312 0.316 
Model χ2  3,909.710 303.040 3,791.150 3,990.300 
p-value  0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
Number of observations  493 22 471 493 
^, * and ** denotes significance at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. One-tailed (two-tailed) test 
is used when the coefficient sign is predicted (not predicted). Refer to section 4 for definitions of 
variables. 
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Table 12 
Factors Associated with the Total Non-procedural Market Announcements for Firms Subject or 
Not Subject to Share Price Queries in the Post-reform Period 
Variable Predicted 
Sign 
Full Sample Subject to 
Share Price 
Queries 
Not Subject to 
Share Price 
Queries 
Full Sample 
Intercept ? 
 
-2.502 
(-13.400**) 
-6.639 
(-3.540**) 
-2.360 
(-12.460**) 
-2.449 
(-13.060**) 
SPQ ? 
 
0.199 
(3.050**)      
-2.502 
(-3.140**) 
BRDSIZE + 
 
-0.055 
(-5.740**) 
-0.282 
(-2.960**) 
-0.046 
(-4.660**) 
-0.048 
(-4.870**) 
SPQ_BRDSIZE ? 
 
   -0.119 
(-3.550**) 
CEOCHAIR + 
 
0.075 
(1.190) 
0.472 
(0.680) 
0.071 
(1.110) 
0.073 
(1.140) 
SPQ_CEOCHAIR ? 
 
   0.823 
(1.580) 
BRDINDP + 
 
0.486 
(5.480**) 
2.059 
(2.110*) 
0.418 
(4.630**) 
0.411 
(4.560**) 
SPQ_BRDINDP ? 
 
   1.518 
(3.170**) 
BRDDIVERSITY + 
 
0.638 
(5.180**) 
-3.450 
(-1.960*) 
0.826 
(6.690**) 
0.826 
(6.690**) 
SPQ_BRDDIVERSITY ? 
 
   -6.098 
(-6.060**) 
AUDITCOM + 
 
0.151 
(4.180**) 
0.930 
(3.500**) 
0.138 
(3.710**) 
0.134 
(3.610**) 
SPQ_AUDITCOM ? 
 
   0.885 
(3.430**) 
ANALYST + 
 
-0.004 
(-0.140) 
0.497 
(1.030) 
0.000 
(0.010) 
0.000 
(0.010) 
ASXLIST ? 
 
0.404 
(11.170**) 
0.464 
(1.400) 
0.420 
(11.350**) 
0.411 
(11.270**) 
OWNCON + 
 
-1.807 
(-7.110**) 
1.196 
(0.190) 
-1.776 
(-6.800**) 
-1.625 
(-6.360**) 
OWNCON2 - 
 
2.447 
(6.120**) 
-3.874 
(-0.180) 
2.435 
(5.970**) 
2.215 
(5.520**) 
ECSIGN ? 
 
-0.091 
(-3.310**) 
0.539 
(1.140) 
-0.129 
(-4.600**) 
-0.118 
(-4.270**) 
EC + 
 
0.014 
(1.610^) 
-0.093 
(-1.410^) 
0.022 
(2.540**) 
0.018 
(2.160*) 
SIZE + 
 
0.236 
(24.650**) 
0.317 
(3.110**) 
0.232 
(23.820**) 
0.236 
(24.560**) 
MB ? 
 
0.023 
(1.240) 
0.030 
(0.160) 
0.009 
(0.460) 
0.010 
(0.560) 
Pseudo R2  0.302 0.568 0.309 0.316 
Model χ2  2,278.450 158.940 2,249.610 2,385.59 
p-value  0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
Number of observations  493 22 471 493 
^, * and ** denotes significance at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. One-tailed (two-tailed) test 
is used when the coefficient sign is predicted (not predicted). Refer to section 4 for definitions of 
variables. 
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Table 13 
Factors Associated with the Total External Market Announcements for Firms Subject or Not 
Subject to Share Price Queries in the Post-reform Period 
Variable Predicted 
Sign 
Full Sample Subject to 
Share Price 
Queries 
Not Subject to 
Share Price 
Queries 
Full Sample 
Intercept ? 
 
-0.865 
(-3.800**) 
-1.352 
(-0.570) 
-0.834 
(-3.590**) 
-0.958 
(-4.170**) 
SPQ ? 
 
 0.290 
(3.530**)     
-0.452 
(-0.400) 
BRDSIZE + 
 
0.001 
(0.100) 
-0.253 
(-2.380**) 
0.016 
(1.370^) 
0.015 
(1.260) 
SPQ_BRDSIZE ? 
 
   -0.192 
(-4.300**) 
CEOCHAIR + 
 
-0.113 
(-1.660*) 
0.674 
(0.580) 
-0.147 
(-2.150*) 
-0.145 
(-2.120*) 
SPQ_CEOCHAIR ? 
 
   2.705 
(2.670**) 
BRDINDP + 
 
0.202 
(1.870*) 
-2.492 
(-2.160*) 
0.261 
(2.360**) 
0.254 
(2.300*) 
SPQ_BRDINDP ? 
 
   -1.755 
(-3.350**) 
BRDDIVERSITY + 
 
0.578 
(4.160**) 
1.715 
(0.900) 
0.719 
(5.140**) 
0.718 
(5.130**) 
SPQ_BRDDIVERSITY ? 
 
   -5.128 
(-5.540**) 
AUDITCOM + 
 
0.039 
(0.980) 
0.462 
(2.280*) 
0.011 
(0.270) 
0.008 
(0.200) 
SPQ_AUDITCOM ? 
 
   0.516 
(2.710**) 
ANALYST + 
 
0.088 
(2.130*) 
1.156 
(2.000*) 
0.120 
(2.830**) 
0.104 
(2.490**) 
ASXLIST ? 
 
-0.613 
(-11.440**) 
-0.200 
(-0.410) 
-0.632 
(-11.530**) 
-0.643 
(-11.940**) 
OWNCON + 
 
-2.621 
(-8.500**) 
-8.002 
(-1.130) 
-2.836 
(-8.980**) 
-2.614 
(-8.480**) 
OWNCON2 - 
 
4.434 
(9.580**) 
25.869 
(1.130) 
4.744 
(10.050**) 
4.436 
(9.580**) 
ECSIGN ? 
 
-0.112 
(-3.300**) 
2.001 
(2.940**) 
-0.160 
(-4.600**) 
-0.136 
(-3.950**) 
EC + 
 
0.090 
(8.720**) 
-0.080 
(-1.200) 
0.105 
(9.880**) 
0.100 
(9.630**) 
SIZE + 
 
0.170 
(14.070**) 
0.188 
(1.380^) 
0.169 
(13.740**) 
0.175 
(14.340**) 
MB ? 
 
-0.042 
(-1.870^) 
0.043 
(0.200) 
-0.063 
(-2.680**) 
-0.059 
(-2.560*) 
Pseudo R2  0.113 0.473 0.125 0.128 
Model χ2  756.430 87.710 808.950 853.270 
p-value  0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
Number of observations  493 22 471 493 
^, * and ** denotes significance at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. One-tailed (two-tailed) test 
is used when the coefficient sign is predicted (not predicted). Refer to section 4 for definitions of 
variables. 
 
